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Abstract: The critical infrastructure (CI) has an important place in Polish security 
system. The article discusses legal acts and characterises the notion of critical 
infrastructure as an element essential for the functioning of the society. As a result of 
the entry into force of the Anti-terrorism Act from 10 June 2016 (Journal of Laws [Dz. 
U.], item 904), the current procedure of security plan acceptance was extended to 
include participation of the Internal Security Agency through the requirement to submit 
a so-called anti-terrorist attachment. The article is an analysis of the constituent parts 
of the document and procedures it covers. Moreover, the authors present conclusions 
and recommendations resulting from the analysis of AT attachments of CI facilities 
and other facilities subject to mandatory protection. The empirical system of reference 
is based on facilities located in Silesia. The authors described their experiences 
related to the process of preparation and acceptance of AT attachments as well as 
conclusions based on employee trainings conducted in workplaces where anti-
terrorism procedures are in force. 
Keywords: critical infrastructure (CI), mandatory protection, crisis management, anti-
terrorism, anti-terrorist attachment 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The aim of the article is to analyse the functionality of security plan related to facilities 
and equipment subject to mandatory protection in respect of terrorist threats, i.e. the 
so-called anti-terrorist attachment (AT attachment). The empirical system of reference 
of this article is based on facilities located in Silesia (some of them constitute the so-
called critical infrastructure - CI) which are subject to mandatory protection. The 
theoretical system of reference is based on the issues regarding security culture and 
sociology of work. The article explains key notions: critical infrastructure, mandatory 
protection and anti-terrorist attachment. The analysis of 14 anti-terrorist attachments 
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allowed to assess functionality of the solutions and to develop recommendations 
regarding the current procedure. 
 
2. THEORETICAL SYSTEMS OF REFERENCE 
Workplace is a social system which is an integral component of a wider economic, 
political and cultural system. The element which bonds this social system together is 
the organisational culture developed more or less consciously by employees 
(Suchacka, 2017). Scientific reflection on the organisational culture draws 
predominantly from organisational sociology but also from social psychology, 
sociology of work and anthropology. Organisational culture of a company consists of 
social norms, value systems stimulating the employees, organisational climate, way of 
management, shared meanings and symbols, cognitive schemas and rules of conduct 
(Nogalski 1998:105). In addition, it is a system of though and behaviour patterns 
which are established within social environment of a given organisation and have 
impact on the achievement of its formal objectives (Sikorski, 2012). Organisational 
culture is defined either as a pattern of fundamental assumptions, discovered or 
developed by a given group through the process of learning, external adaptation and 
internal integration or as a pattern of values, frequently perceived as self-evident, 
which help members of an organisation to understand which actions are acceptable 
and which are not. Technical culture – an attitude toward technical devices utilised 
within a workplace is also an element of organisational culture (Ejdys, 2010). Another 
noteworthy notion is the security culture of an organisation which is a state of threat 
awareness of the employees, formal and informal norms of response to dangerous 
situations as well as technical and organisational preparations which affect the level of 
attention for security and health protection in managing a company, organizing tasks, 
supervising and assessment of the employees (Ejdys, 2010). In this respect, the 
introduction of the obligation to prepare the anti-terrorist attachment is a very 
important step in developing and strengthening the security culture of workplaces 
essential for the functioning of the Republic of Poland and Polish society. Actions 
undertaken to provide an adequate protection of the country’s critical infrastructure 
are a significant step towards building a civil society which is aware of dangers, able 
to counteract them and, in a crisis situation, react to them. 
 
3. CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE OF A STATE 
According to the Crisis Management Act of 26 April 2007 (Journal of Laws [Dz. U.] 
from 2013 item 1166 and from 2015 item 1485), critical infrastructure consists of 
systems and its constituent functional facilities, including structures, equipment, 
installations, services which are crucial to the security of a state and its people and 
which ensure the effective functioning of public administration, institutions and 
businesses. Critical infrastructure includes systems related to: energy supply, energy-
producing raw materials and fuels, communications, IT networks, finance, food and 
water supply, health protection, transport, medical emergency response, continuity of 
public administration, production, holding, storage and use of chemical and 
radioactive substances including pipelines for dangerous substances. CI consists of 
physical and software systems (facilities, equipment and installations) necessary for 
basic functioning of the economy and country. Not every strategic facility is a part of 
critical infrastructure. The decision of inclusion of a given facility in the CI is based on 
Brought to you by | Uniwersytet Slaski - University of Silesia - Silesian University
Authenticated
Download Date | 5/14/19 10:37 AM
SYSTEM SAFETY: HUMAN -TECHNICAL FACILITY - ENVIRONMENT, CzOTO  vol. 1, Iss.1, 2019         896 
detailed criteria specified in a classified attachment to the National Programme for 
Critical Infrastructure Protection (2018). 
CI facilities play a crucial role in the proper functioning of a state and the life of 
society. However, critical infrastructure is susceptible to destruction, damage and 
disruption, which may be caused by forces of nature or human actions, entailing 
threat to life and property of citizens as well as negative consequences to the 
development of the economy. It is impossible not the mention the psychological 
effects – fear, sense of insecurity in society and lack of trust in all levels of 
government. Therefore, it is one of the top priorities of the authorities of the Republic 
of Poland to protect critical infrastructure through, according to the article 3, point 3 of 
the Crisis Management Act, all actions designed to ensure functionality, continuity of 
operation and integrity of critical infrastructure in order to prevent threats, risks or 
vulnerabilities, limit and neutralise their effects and quickly restore the infrastructure in 
case of a failure, attack or other event interfering with its proper functioning. As 
reflected on the website of the Polish Government Centre for Security (Rządowe 
Centrum Bezpieczeństwa): “One of the elements of crisis management related to 
critical infrastructure protection is the cooperation of public administration. The 
cooperation consists in joint actions designed to improve safety conditions. Another 
important element is the cooperation between the administration and business. Its aim 
is to develop transparent rules and procedures by both the administration and sole or 
dependent owners of structures, installations or equipment categorised as part of 
critical infrastructure. This is due to the fact that a substantial part of the infrastructure 
of key importance for national security is currently in the hands of private sector” 
(https://rcb.gov.pl/zarzadzanie-kryzysowe/). 
It should be noted that special services perform a specific role in CI protection. These 
agencies have at their disposal well-trained personnel and resources for identification 
of threats caused by intentional human action. Sharing information related to threats 
with CI operators and other entities competent in the field of CI protection is crucial to 
planning the security of these structures and assessing the risk of an attack. A special 
role is played by the Internal Security Agency (Agencja Bezpieczeństwa 
Wewnętrznego). According to the article 4, sections 1-3 of the Anti-Terrorism Act: 
Public administration authorities, owners and holders of structures, installations, 
equipment of the public administration or critical infrastructure cooperate with bodies, 
agencies and institutions competent in the field of security and crisis management in 
the implementation of anti-terrorist activities. The abovementioned bodies and entities 
immediately inform the head of the Internal Security Agency about terrorist threats to 
public administration infrastructure or critical infrastructure including threats to 
systems and networks related to electric power, water and sewage, heating and IT 
which are important from the point of view of national security. When information on 
possibility of a terrorist action threatening public administration infrastructure or critical 
infrastructure, life or human health, property, national heritage or environment 
reaches the agency, the head of the agency can issue instructions to the bodies and 
entities in danger providing them with necessary information on how to counter, 
eliminate or minimise the impact of the threat. Additionally, these bodies and entities 
report to the head of Internal Security Agency on the actions taken in that respect. 
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4. ANTI-TERRORIST ATTACHMENT TO SECURITY PLAN 
According to the legal definition, mandatory protection means: protection of areas, 
structures, equipment and shipments crucial to the defence and economic interest of 
the country, public security and other important interests of the country provided by 
specialist armed units or adequate technical protection, in accordance with the 
relevant provisions of the People and Property Protection Act from 22 August 1997 
(Journal of Laws [Dz. U.] from 2014, item 1099 and from 2015, item 1505). Article 5 of 
the said act divides areas, structures and equipment into groups according to the 
following categories: national defence, protection of the economic interest of the 
country, public security, protection of other important interests of the country and 
additionally: structures (including buildings), equipment, installations, services 
included in the uniform list of structures, installations, equipment and services which 
are part of the critical infrastructure. Detailed lists of areas, structures and equipment 
are prepared by: the President of the National Bank of Poland, National Broadcasting 
Council, ministers, heads of central offices and governors with respect to 
subordinated or supervised organisational offices. Inclusion of a given area, structure 
or equipment in this list is made by means of an administrative decision. Governors 
keep record of areas, structures and equipment subject to mandatory protection 
located within a province. According to the data provided by the Police Headquarters 
(Komenda Główna Policji), within the territory of the Republic of Poland there are 
3490 structures subject to mandatory protection (situation at 31 December 2017), of 
which 368 are located in the Silesian province and an equal number in the Greater 
Poland province which is the highest number in the country. 
Prior to the entry into force of the Anti-Terrorism Act, the acceptance procedure of a 
security plan of areas, structures and equipment present on the provincial list of 
areas, structures and equipment subject to mandatory protection consisted in 
obtaining approval of such plans from the Police Headquarters and Provincial Fire 
Service Headquarter (Komenda Wojewódzka Straży Pożarnej). According to the 
current regulations, the preparation of a security plan requires also participation of the 
Internal Security Agency (in respect of terrorist threats). A result of the entry into force 
the Anti-terrorism Act from 10 June 2016 (Journal of Laws [Dz. U.], item 904) was the 
amendment of the article 7, section 1 of the People and Property Protection Act which 
reads as follows: ”An infrastructure administrator who directly manages areas, 
structures an equipment present on the list described in the article 5, section 5 or a 
person authorised by the administrator are obliged to receive acceptance of the 
security plan of the areas, structures and equipment from the competent provincial 
Chief of the Police and, regarding terrorist threats, from the competent director of 
Internal Security Agency local office”. It follows that an administrator of a structure 
(area or equipment) present on the confidential provincial list of areas, structures and 
equipment subject to mandatory protection is obliged to prepare and submit to the 
correct division of the Internal Security Agency the so-called anti-terrorist attachment, 
i.e. protection scheme of a structure (area or equipment) in respect of terrorist threats. 
The acceptance procedure of a security plan of an area, structure of equipment 
subject to mandatory protection against terrorist threats available on the Internal 
Security Agency’s webpage specifies that an AT attachment should consists of: first 
page form, table of contents with page numbers, table with terrorist attack risk 
assessment (with risk level to a given area, structure or equipment), personnel 
evacuation procedure in case of a terrorist threat which takes into account the nature 
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of the attack (attack using firearms and sharp tools; attack using explosives; chemical, 
biological, radiological and nuclear attack), the scope of actions undertaken on each 
state of alert (does not include the CRP states of alert) stipulated in the Anti-terrorist 
Act (ALFA, BRAVO, CHARLIE, DELTA) in an administrative area where the area, 
structure or equipment subject to mandatory protection is situated and contact 
information necessary for mutual cooperation: the address of a facility (structure, area 
or equipment), fixed telephone number and e-mail address. When the consultations 
and preparation is performed by a person appointed by the facility administrator, it is 
necessary to issue an authorisation. AT attachment is a non-classified document. 
Receiving acceptance takes place as follows: a draft of the AT attachment is prepared 
and submitted to the competent local office of the Internal Security Agency; if 
necessary, the director makes required adjustments; 2 paper copies of the AT 
attachment are submitted to the Internal Security Agency local office which then either 
accepts the AT attachment or rejects it and sends the 2 copies of the document back 
with appropriate annotations. Subsequently, the Internal Security Agency local office 
informs the competent provincial chief of the police (or the Commander-in-Chief of the 
Police) that the attachment was accepted or rejected. The procedure in its present 
version has been in force since 1st January 2017 and during the period from January 
to November 2017 450 attachments has been accepted (of which 200 were pending 
acceptance). In the following year (situation at 19th November 2018), 1160 AT 
attachments have been accepted and 180 were pending acceptance..  
 
5. AT ATTACHMENT – STUDY ASSUMPTIONS 
The empirical system of reference of this article is based on companies which are 
known to the authors. However, revealing more detailed information like their names, 
industry and characteristics is not crucial for the clarity of reasoning and may result in 
violation of the law. The authors participated in the process of preparation and 
acceptance of the AT attachments for those facilities. The analysis included in total 14 
AT attachments to security plans of businesses subject to mandatory protection, 5 of 
which were part of critical infrastructure. Both in the case of CI and other facilities 
subject to mandatory protection, the procedure of acceptance and the contents of the 
AT attachments is identical. The analysed facilities differed in terms of production 
specifics, size of the occupied area, number of buildings/equipment situated in the 
facility, number of employees and the number of specialised security and protection 
(SUFO/WSO) employees. Although each facility was a separate case, the AT 
attachments were prepared following the same guidelines. Additionally, the AT 
procedure training schemes for the personnel of the facilities were analysed as well 
as reactions and comments made by the employees on the preparation and 
implementation of procedures in case of a terrorist attack on their workplace. As a 
result of data analysis, conclusions and recommendations regarding the AT 
attachment acceptance procedure were formulated. The AT procedure training has 
not yet been conducted in the study group of facilities, however, it is planned and will 
be analysed by the authors during next stages of the research process. 
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6. AT ATTACHMENT IN CI FACILITIES – CONCLUSIONS AND   
RECOMMENDATIONS 
Firstly, the AT attachment is prepared for facilities of very different categories – large 
industrial plants employing several thousand people or small establishments recorded 
on the provincial list employing 2-4 people (where during some shifts there is only one 
person on duty). This requires completely distinct assumptions regarding the 
procedure for notifying, evacuation and decision-making. In case of a threat, it is 
impossible to follow the standard procedure for notifying the facility administrator 
responsible for initiating the evacuation who is in a building situated a couple or a 
dozen kilometres away. If there is only one specialised security and protection 
employee (WSO/SUFO) present at all times in such facility and s/he is currently 
performing a foot patrol on a relatively large area s/he will not be able to evacuate the 
facility, especially when the situation develops dynamically. The abovementioned 
conditions make it necessary to train in detail the employees of such facilities with 
regard to the correct behaviour and procedures related to evacuation for different 
kinds of threats. The AT attachment is a document which defines these behaviours 
and materials available at antyterroryzm.gov.pl webpage allow to adequately train 
personnel. 
Secondly, in the acceptance procedure of the AT attachment there are no clear 
guidelines on the evacuation of personnel crucial for the proper functioning of the 
production systems, for example people who control technological processes. 
Disruption of operation of some machines may result in an ecological crisis, 
endangering of thousands of human lives or substantial economic losses. 
Thirdly, the procedure of AT attachment acceptance imposes designation of so-called 
emergency safe rooms and alternative emergency safe rooms within and beyond a 
workplace area. In the case of the so-called internal emergency safe rooms it would 
be ideal to designate a room which is spacious enough for all personnel, has 
reinforced door, does not have windows (protection against attackers armed with 
firearms), has water and telephone connections. Finding such room in a production 
plant proves to be difficult and oftentimes requires an overhaul or infrastructure 
adjustment. Due to lack of precise requirements in the procedure, it is harder to 
request financial resources for such investment with no legal basis. This may lead to a 
situation in which emergency safe rooms are designated in buildings which are not 
suitable. Moreover, the procedure does not specify the ways of notifying about a 
threat. In the analysed cases, telephone contact was the method of threat notification. 
Lack of clearly specified guidelines results in selection of not the best solutions but the 
cheapest ones which do not require the interference in the infrastructure of the 
workplace. 
Fourthly, the procedure does not specify how to mark emergency safe rooms and 
alternative emergency safe rooms in such a way that for a bystander or potential 
attacker they are incomprehensible and at the same time are clearly understandable 
for employees. Although the employees are familiar with the AT attachment, are 
trained with regard to the security procedures and participate in drills, in a dangerous 
situation, stress and panic may lead to irrational behaviours, hence the need for 
legible demarcation of emergency safe rooms. In the analysed cases, signs depicting 
semantically neutral objects related to the specificity of the production were used. For 
a bystander they were meaningless but for the employees who were informed that 
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these signs signify either the emergency safe room or the gate which will be used for 
evacuation in case of a terrorist threat. 
Sixthly, the first part of the AT attachment – the so-called Terrorist attack risk 
assessment table was designed in such a way that it is exceptionally difficult to obtain 
a result other that low terrorist risk level for a protected facility, area or equipment. 
Facilities seem not to be in a direct danger of a terrorist attack - it is questionable if a 
threat indicator measured using such method is credible. 
Seventhly, it is appropriate to include in the AT attachment a procedure to be followed 
when an unmanned aerial vehicle (drone) appears over a facility. On one hand it may 
be performing an observation as a part of preparation phase of an attack, on the other 
hand, it may be carrying explosive materials/CBRN. 
Eighthly, in the context of the implementation of the procedures specified in the AT 
attachment, communication with the employees of a given facility is a very important 
element. Frequently the personnel is not aware of the existence of a terrorist threat 
and reacts with condescending smiles when asked to participate in an AT training 
stressing the pointlessness of such preparations in a safe country. Lack of proper 
security education on the above-school level means that people conducting training 
related to the AT attachment procedures should not only have necessary general 
competence for training but above all specialist knowledge of security, anti-terrorism, 
activity of terrorist organisations and modus operandi of potential attackers to make 
people aware that the threat is real and following the AT procedures can save their 
lives. 
Ninthly, in the case of the AT attachment, there is no equivalent to Methodology of 
acceptance of security plans related to areas, facilities and equipment subject to 
mandatory protection. The procedure of AT attachment acceptance is still very 
general. The information it contains to a large extent depend on the interpretation of 
the officer who examines the documents in the respective Internal Security Agency 
local office. Therefore, it would be reasonable to specify the guidelines related to 
emergency safe rooms, decision-making process in case of an evacuation and 
standards of evacuation notification. The information on these issues can be obtained 
through consultations with respective Internal Security Agency local office, however, 
such procedure prolongs the process of preparation and acceptance of the 
attachment making it more time consuming for both sides.  
Lastly, in the analysed cases, the training related to the AT attachment procedures 
covers not only the rules of evacuation form a workplace premises but also the 
general rules on how to behave in a dangerous situation, for example instructions on 
what to do with a suspicious package, the Run, Hide, Fight rule and developing 
correct reactions and reflexes: observation of the surroundings and paying attention to 
suspicious objects or people. The trainings teach also how to behave in a hostage-
taking situation and what not to do when anti-terrorist squad enters the premises of a 
workplace. Therefore, the importance of training in the process of security education 
and improvement of safety in everyday life is substantial. 
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